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CAN CONDOMS BE COMPELLING?
EXAMINING THE STATE INTEREST IN
CONFISCATING CONDOMS FROM SUSPECTED
SEX WORKERS
Meghan Newcomer*
Confiscating condoms from suspected sex workers leaves them at risk for
HIV/AIDS, other sexually transmitted diseases, and unwanted pregnancy.
Yet, police officers in New York, Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles collect
condoms from sex workers to use against them as evidence of prostitution.
Sometimes, the condoms are taken solely for the purpose of harassment.
These actions put sex workers at risk of contracting sexually transmitted
diseases because they may continue to engage in sex work without using
protection.
In the landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut, the U.S. Supreme Court
established a fundamental privacy right in the use and access of
contraceptive devices. While this right has been examined in the context of
married couples and individuals, it has not been applied to the confiscation
of condoms, a contraceptive device, by police officers. This Note shows
that by taking condoms from suspected sex workers, police officers and
departments are actually violating sex workers’ constitutional right to
privacy, and, therefore, the practice must be abandoned.
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INTRODUCTION
“The police have told me . . . don’t carry more than three condoms on
you because we can arrest you.”1 This statement was made to Human
Rights Watch by Lola L., a sex worker in Los Angeles. Lola also conducts
street outreach work and expressed concern about the condoms-as-evidence
policy. In New York City, Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles, police
officers confiscate condoms to use as evidence of prostitution against
suspected sex workers.2 Police officers are entitled to stop people they
reasonably believe are engaged in criminal activity,3 at which time they are
permitted to conduct a limited search of the suspect when they believe their

1. MEGAN MCLEMORE, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SEX WORKERS AT RISK: CONDOMS AS
EVIDENCE OF PROSTITUTION IN FOUR U.S. CITIES 49 (2012).
2. See id. at 1.
3. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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safety is at risk.4 However, police officers are not following these
requirements when confiscating condoms.5 These officers not only take
condoms for the purpose of evidence, but sometimes simply to throw
Human rights organizations have criticized this policy as
away.6
detrimental to the health of sex workers and likely to increase the spread of
HIV/AIDS in cities that have previously experienced AIDS epidemics.7 In
fact, in each of the three cities discussed above, “millions of condoms are
distributed by the public health department each year as part of highly
visible HIV prevention campaigns.”8 Despite these pressing health needs,
in the United States, 52 percent of surveyed sex workers have chosen not to
carry condoms because they fear confrontation with police officers for
possessing them, and consequently these workers continue to engage in
unsafe sex.9
The U.S. Supreme Court has long upheld a right to privacy that includes
the right to access and use contraceptives.10 In Carey v. Population
Services International, the Court held that regulations imposing burdens on
the right to contraception are only valid when they are necessary to achieve
a compelling state interest.11 Any claimed state interest must be narrowly
tailored so as to infringe on the smallest possible portion of any
fundamental right.12 While the Court has struck down regulations
interfering with contraceptive rights in a variety of contexts, it has not
examined police officers’ widespread confiscation of alleged sex workers’
condoms.13
This Note argues that confiscating alleged sex workers’ condoms violates
their constitutional right to privacy because prosecuting prostitution is not a
sufficiently compelling state interest to permit police officers to interfere
with the right to contraceptives. Part I of this Note discusses fundamental
rights protected under the Supreme Court’s substantive due process
doctrine, then details the experience of sex workers in New York,
Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles, examining the frequency and purpose
behind the taking and use of condoms as evidence by police officers. Part
4. Id. at 24.
5. McLemore, supra note 1, at 1.
6. See id. at 39 (“[T]he cops harassed me and told me to throw my condoms in the
garbage.”).
7. Id. at 34; see also ACACIA SHIELDS, OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS, CRIMINALIZING
CONDOMS: HOW POLICING PRACTICES PUT SEX WORKERS AND HIV SERVICES AT RISK IN
KENYA, NAMIBIA, RUSSIA, SOUTH AFRICA, THE UNITED STATES, AND ZIMBABWE (2012).
8. See MCLEMORE, supra note 1, at 10.
9. See SHIELDS, supra note 7, at 4; see also Garima Malhotra, Good Intentions, Bad
Consequences: How Congress’s Efforts To Eradicate HIV/AIDS Stifle the Speech of
Humanitarian Organizations, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 839, 862 (2012) (discussing the risks
most often associated with sex work, including police harassment, violence, exposure to
sexually transmitted diseases, and unwanted pregnancies).
10. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (holding that citizens are
entitled to make decisions about contraception without unjustified government interference).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 686.
13. See id. at 678; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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II explains the Court’s contraceptives jurisprudence and then examines the
state interests in confiscating condoms for evidence while enforcing
antiprostitution laws. Part III argues that this police practice violates the
protections laid out in the Supreme Court’s contraception cases.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND CRIMINAL LAW FRAMEWORK FOR
ANALYZING THE CONFISCATION OF CONDOMS AS EVIDENCE FROM
SUSPECTED SEX WORKERS
This Part describes the constitutional and criminal procedure framework
for evaluating the constitutionality of police practices, before discussing the
practice of confiscating condoms from suspected sex workers. Part I.A
describes the constitutional law framework for evaluating infringements of
rights that the Supreme Court has deemed fundamental. Part I.B describes
criminal procedure laws that relate to stopping and searching people
suspected of engaging in criminal activity. Part I.C discusses the
international human rights law framework to which the United States is
subject in relation to preventing the spread of sexually transmitted diseases.
Part I.D then discusses the experience of sex workers in three cities, New
York City, Los Angeles, and Washington, D.C., and their interactions with
police officers who are engaged in confiscating condoms.
A. Constitutional Law Framework
The Constitution and the Bill of Rights protect fundamental rights. This
section discusses the Supreme Court’s history of upholding those
protections and the extension of those protections to rights not specifically
enumerated in the Bill of Rights.
1. Fundamental Rights Analysis Under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment14 provides that no
state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”15 From this amendment, the Supreme Court has created a
detailed jurisprudence of due process.16 There are two types of due
process: procedural due process and substantive due process.17 Procedural
due process concerns whether the government has sufficiently provided the
procedural protections guaranteed by the Constitution before taking away
life, liberty or property.18 Substantive due process issues arise when there
is a question regarding whether the government has a sufficient goal or
purpose to justify an action that infringes on a person’s right to life, liberty,
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
15. Id.
16. See Lee Goldman, The Constitutional Right to Privacy, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 601,
604 (2006).
17. Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1501, 1501
(1999).
18. Id.
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or property.19 Substantive due process protects both rights explicitly stated
in the Bill of Rights and rights that the Supreme Court has decreed are
“deeply rooted in our history and traditions, or . . . fundamental to our
concept of constitutionally ordered liberty,”20 including the right to
privacy.21 Under the privacy heading, the Supreme Court has held that due
process protects the right to marry,22 to have children,23 to direct the
education and upbringing of one’s children,24 to enjoy marital privacy,25 to
use contraception,26 to obtain an abortion,27 and to maintain bodily
integrity.28 Because these rights are fundamental, the Supreme Court
accords them the highest protection, the strict scrutiny test, discussed
below.29
2. Three Levels of Scrutiny for Evaluating Fundamental Rights
The Supreme Court has defined three levels of scrutiny for determining
whether a government action is unconstitutional: (1) the rational basis test,
(2) intermediate scrutiny, and (3) strict scrutiny.30 These different levels of
scrutiny place varying burdens of proof on the government: a heavy burden
for infringing on a fundamental right, but a lower burden in areas where the

19. Id.
20. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997).
21. See Chemerinksy, supra note 17, at 1501; see also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 549
(1961) (“[T]he concept of ‘privacy’ embodied in the Fourth Amendment is part of the
‘ordered liberty’ assured against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s right of privacy has been
declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
[Amendment] . . . .”).
22. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that a Virginia state miscegenation
statute that forbade interracial marriages violates due process and equal protection
guarantees).
23. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that a criminal law statute
which allowed the sterilization of convicts violated one of the “basic civil rights of man” and
was therefore unconstitutional).
24. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (declaring unconstitutional a state
law that banned parochial schools as violating a parent’s right to control the upbringing of
their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (ruling unconstitutional a statute
that forbade the teaching of a foreign language in schools as violating parental rights to
direct the upbringing of their children, a protected right under the Fourteenth Amendment).
25. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding unconstitutional a state law
that interfered with married couples’ right to use contraception).
26. Id.; see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (declaring unconstitutional a
state law that forbade single individuals from obtaining contraception while permitting
married couples to do so as violating the equal protection doctrine).
27. Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (affirming the right
to abortion as a fundamental right protected by the constitution); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (establishing the right to obtain an abortion before fetal viability as a fundamental
right).
28. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (finding that forcing ingestion of a
substance to produce vomiting into a person suspected of swallowing drugs violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
29. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); see also infra Part I.A.3–4.
30. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 6.5, at
552–54 (4th ed. 2011).
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Court generally defers to the legislature.31 The rational basis test is the
least stringent standard of review and requires laws to be “rationally related
to a legitimate government purpose” to be upheld.32 Because this test only
requires that a law be rationally related to a conceivable government
purpose, most governmental actions reviewed under this standard are
upheld.33
Under intermediate scrutiny, a law is upheld if it “substantially relate[s]
to a legitimate government purpose.”34 Courts sometimes refer to this
standard as heightened scrutiny because of the stronger correlation required
between the state’s law and purpose.35 Laws that discriminate by gender,
for example, are reviewed under this framework.36
The most demanding type of scrutiny is strict scrutiny, which requires
that a law be “necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose” to be
upheld.37 This also means that “the State’s asserted purpose must be
specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose.”38 Courts use
this highest level of scrutiny when considering laws based on racial
classifications39 and laws that infringe on rights deemed fundamental by the
Supreme Court, including the right to access and use contraception.40
3. Requirements for Government Infringement of a Fundamental Right
There are four questions that are relevant to a fundamental rights
analysis: Is there a fundamental right at issue?41 Has that right been
infringed by state action?42 Is the government action justified by a
compelling interest?43 And are the means of effectuating the law

31. Id. § 6.5, at 551; see also Eric Heinze, The Logic of Standards of Review in
Constitutional Cases: A Deontic Analysis, 28 VT. L. REV. 121, 123 (2004).
32. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, § 6.5, at 552 (emphasis omitted).
33. Id. § 6.5, at 553; see, e.g., U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (holding
that under rational basis review, the Supreme Court will not invalidate laws Congress enacts
when they are supported by a conceivable government purpose).
34. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, § 6.5, at 553 (emphasis omitted).
35. See Peter S. Smith, The Demise of Three-Tier Review: Has the United States
Supreme Court Adopted a “Sliding Scale” Approach Toward Equal Protection
Jurisprudence?, 23 J. CONTEMP. L. 475, 478 (1997).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976).
37. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, § 6.5, at 554 (emphasis omitted).
38. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986).
39. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005) (holding that a prison policy of
segregating prisoners based on race must meet strict scrutiny).
40. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, § 6.5, at 554; see also Suzanne Davis & Paul
Lansing, When Two Fundamental Rights Collide at the Pharmacy: The Struggle To Balance
the Consumer’s Right To Access Contraception and the Pharmacist’s Right of Conscience,
12 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 67, 86 (2009) (“[U]sing contraception is considered a
fundamental right under right of privacy law and consequently it should be free from
governmental interference.”); Gwendolyn Prothro, Ru 486 Examined: Impact of a New
Technology on an Old Controversy, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 715, 721 (1997).
41. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, § 10.1.2, at 814.
42. Id. at 816.
43. Id. at 817.
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sufficiently tailored to the goal?44 Under the strict scrutiny analysis used
for fundamental rights, the government bears the burden of proving that the
infringement of the constitutional right is necessary to achieve a compelling
government purpose and that the law is narrowly tailored to involve the
smallest infringement of the right.45
a. The Law Serves a Compelling State Interest
The government must prove that an infringement of a fundamental right
is necessary for a law to accomplish a compelling government purpose, or
the law will be struck down.46 The Supreme Court has not articulated the
criteria necessary for establishing when an infringement serves a
compelling government purpose, but “the government has the burden of
persuading the Court that a truly vital interest is served by the law in
question.”47
While a compelling government purpose is a high bar to meet, the
Supreme Court found that the government had a compelling interest in
issues of wartime necessity in Korematsu v. United States.48 In Korematsu,
the Court upheld the internment of Japanese American citizens based solely
on their race as the means necessary to protect national security.49 Citing
the hardships involved in war for all citizens, the Court found that an
infringement of liberty on the basis of national origin was constitutional
because of the compelling government interest in keeping America safe.50
Referencing modern warfare abilities, the Court stated that “the power to
protect must be commensurate with the threatened danger.”51 This
government interest in protecting American citizens during wartime was a
sufficiently compelling state interest to meet the strict scrutiny standard.52
In Zablocki v. Redhail53 the Court also found a compelling state interest in
the need to adequately care for children. A Wisconsin law prohibited
marriage for parents with a minor child not in their custody unless the
parent could prove that he or she had made all child support payments. The
Court found that the ability to ensure that children are properly cared for
was a “legitimate and substantial interest[],”54 however the state statute was
overly broad and therefore did not satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement
of strict scrutiny.55

44. Id. at 817–18.
45. Id. § 6.5, at 554.
46. Id.
47. Id. § 10.1.2, at 817.
48. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
49. See id. at 223–24.
50. See id. at 219–20. National origin classifications, like race, are subject to strict
scrutiny.
51. Id. at 220.
52. Id.
53. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
54. Id. at 388.
55. Id. at 389.
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b. The Law Is Narrowly Tailored to the State Interest
To pass a strict scrutiny standard, the government must also be able to
prove that the law, as enacted, is the “least restrictive” or “least
discriminatory” alternative available.56 This narrow tailoring requirement
means that legislation cannot be under- or overinclusive, and that “the fit
between the government’s action and its asserted purpose [must] be ‘as
perfect as practicable.’”57 In analyzing a state’s interest, any infringing
regulation must be precisely tailored to avoid infringing on a fundamental
right.58 If the law could be enacted in a way that would result in less
interference with a fundamental right, then the law will not survive the
Moreover, the requirement against
narrow tailoring analysis.59
overinclusive regulations suggests that even if there is not a less intrusive
alternative, the narrow tailoring requirement may still not be satisfied.60
Because of this very high standard, most laws analyzed under strict scrutiny
are struck down.61
B. Criminal Procedure Framework
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures, requiring both federal and state actors to obtain a warrant before
depriving a person of liberty or property.62 The Supreme Court has created
exceptions to the warrant requirement, allowing police officers to conduct
searches or seizures without a warrant when there is a sufficient level of
suspicion that criminal activity is occurring.63 Police officers conduct

56. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, § 6.5, at 554; see also, e.g., Simon & Schuster,
Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 121–23 (1991) (stating that
when a substantial burden on a right subject to strict scrutiny does not serve the
government’s stated purpose, the narrow tailoring requirement will not be met).
57. Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict
Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 360 (2006).
58. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (stating that “[p]recision of regulation”
is the “touchstone” of narrow tailoring).
59. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1326
(2007).
60. Id. at 1328 (“Whereas the least restrictive alternative formulation invites the
conclusion that a regulation that is necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest
will therefore satisfy strict scrutiny as long as no narrower regulation would suffice, the
prohibition against overinclusiveness suggests that a statute might be condemned for lack of
narrow tailoring even if no less restrictive alternative existed.”).
61. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, § 6.5, at 554; Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (calling strict scrutiny “strict in theory and fatal in fact”).
62. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”); see
also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (incorporating the protections guaranteed in the
Fourth Amendment against the states).
63. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishing the reasonable suspicion
standard for limited stops).
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warrantless searches of suspected sex workers based on the suspicion that
they are engaging in sex work in violation of state criminal laws.64
1. Probable Cause Is Necessary To Initiate an Arrest
Because an arrest is an invasive seizure, the level of suspicion necessary
to arrest a person is the high standard of probable cause.65 Probable cause
exists for an arrest when a reasonable police officer believes, in light of all
the facts available, that a man of reasonable caution could believe that a
crime was being or had been committed.66 Once a police officer has placed
a person under arrest, the officer may conduct a limited search of that
person incident to the arrest for two purposes: to determine if the person
has any weapons that pose a danger to the officer, and to collect evidence to
prevent its destruction.67 The Supreme Court’s holding in Chimel v.
California allows police officers to collect evidence “on the arrestee’s
person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.”68 In United
States v. Robinson,69 the Court extended this ability to search incident to an
arrest, giving police officers the ability to search any container on the
person found during a lawful arrest, even without suspicion that the
container holds a dangerous item posing a risk to officer safety.70 This
allows officers to search any container on a person for evidence of a crime
incident to a lawful arrest.71
2. Terry Stops Can Be Conducted on the Basis of Reasonable Suspicion
In Terry v. Ohio,72 the Supreme Court held that police officers may
conduct a limited stop of a person based on reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot.73 The officer may also conduct a limited frisk of
the stopped person if there is reasonable suspicion that the person is
carrying a weapon that could harm the officer.74 In permitting warrantless
searches based on low levels of suspicion, the Court emphasized the
importance of the state interest in protecting police officers and stopping
crime, balancing that interest against the very limited intrusion that occurs

64. See infra notes 77–82 and accompanying text.
65. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963).
66. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925) (holding that probable cause
exists when “the facts and circumstances within [an officer’s] knowledge and of which [the
officer] had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient in themselves to warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief that” a crime was being committed).
67. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
68. Id. at 763; see also Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police
Authority To Search Incident to Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 391 (2001).
69. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
70. See id.; see also James J. Tomkovicz, Divining and Designing the Future of the
Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine: Avoiding Instability, Irrationality, and Infidelity, 2007
U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1431.
71. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
72. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
73. Id. at 30.
74. Id. at 24.
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with a short stop and frisk.75 Because the intrusion is so minimal, the Court
found the lower standard of reasonable suspicion, instead of probable cause,
sufficient to conduct what is now called a “Terry stop.”76
C. The Police Practice of Taking Condoms from Suspected Sex Workers
This section discusses the research conducted by human rights
organizations laying out the experience of sex workers and outreach
workers in New York City, Los Angeles, and Washington, D.C. It
describes their interactions with police officers in relation to the condomsas-evidence policies practiced in each city. It also discusses policies and
pending legislation enacted as a result of growing criticisms of condoms-asevidence practices.
1. The Practice of Taking Condoms As Evidence in New York City
This section discusses the law and policies that permit police officers in
New York City to take condoms from suspected sex workers.
a. New York Laws Governing Prostitution and
Prostitution-Related Offenses
New York State defines prostitution as occurring when a person
“engages or agrees or offers to engage in sexual conduct with another
person in return for a fee.”77 New York law also makes it a crime to loiter
for the purpose of prostitution, defined by the law as
[a]ny person who remains or wanders about in a public place and
repeatedly beckons to, or repeatedly stops, or repeatedly attempts to stop,
or repeatedly attempts to engage passers-by in conversation, or repeatedly
stops or attempts to stop motor vehicles, or repeatedly interferes with the
free passage of other persons, for the purpose of prostitution.78

It is also a criminal act to promote prostitution,79 patronize prostitution,80 or
engage in sex trafficking81 in New York. Prostitution is a misdemeanor
offense, while loitering for the purpose of prostitution is a violation or a
possible misdemeanor.82 For police officers to stop someone and search
them for an attempted prostitution crime, there must be sufficient evidence

75. Id.; see also Mark A. Godsey, When Terry Met Miranda: Two Constitutional
Doctrines Collide, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 715, 746 (1994) (discussing the limited intrusion
involved in a Terry stop).
76. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30–31.
77. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.00 (McKinney 2012).
78. Id. § 240.37.
79. Id. §§ 230.15–.32.
80. Id. §§ 230.02–.10.
81. Id. § 230.34.
82. See id. §§ 230.00–240.37. If loitering for prostitution is characterized as a violation,
the only penalty is a fine, however if it is punished as a misdemeanor, a person can face jail
time, a fine, or both. Id. § 240.37.
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that a reasonable police officer could believe that the crime of prostitution
was occurring or was likely to occur.83
b. Firsthand Accounts from Sex Workers in New York City
In compiling their data on the use of condoms as evidence of prostitution,
Human Rights Watch interviewed a group of sex workers to discuss their
interactions with police and the process frequently undertaken when police
officers suspect a person of being engaged in sex work.84 Sex workers
reported that not only were they stopped and searched by police officers,
because of the low threshold necessary for initiating a stop and search,85
police officers frequently took their condoms and commented on the
number of contraceptives they had on their person.86 One sex worker from
Queens, New York, reported that, after being stopped by police officers and
asked to empty her purse, she left condoms in the bottom of her purse.87
When the police noticed the condoms, they told her that next time they
caught her they would arrest her for carrying condoms, because condoms
served as evidence that she was engaged in prostitution.88 Another person
engaged in sex work in Brooklyn, New York, stated that if police officers
find a person is carrying more than three or four condoms “they will take
them, they will be disrespectful.”89 Still another sex worker stated that
while working in Queens, two cops arrested her for carrying condoms.90
She stated, “The charge was that I had more than one condom in my bag.
They locked me up for two days for solicitation and prostitution . . . they
said I had condoms, it was on the report.”91
In interviews conducted by the Urban Justice Center for a report on
street-based prostitution in New York City, sex workers similarly reported
that police officers interfered with their condoms.92 The Village Voice, a
New York City periodical, was also told stories about police officers taking
condoms from people they suspected of engaging in sex work.93 Both the
Urban Justice Center report and the interviews conducted by the Village
Voice corroborate the information provided to Human Rights Watch.94
In 2010, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
conducted a survey with local organizations to assess whether police
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
See MCLEMORE, supra note 1, at 17.
See supra Part I.D.1.a.
See MCLEMORE, supra note 1, at 18.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 20.
Id. (alteration in original).
JUHU THUKRAL & MELISSA DITMORE, URBAN JUSTICE CENTER, SEX WORKERS
PROJECTS, REVOLVING DOOR: AN ANALYSIS OF STREET-BASED PROSTITUTION IN NEW YORK
CITY 79 (2003).
93. Emily Gogolak, New York’s Condom Bait-and-Switch, VILLAGE VOICE (Mar. 6,
2013), http://www.villagevoice.com/2013-03-06/news/nyc-s-condom-insanity/full/.
94. See supra notes 84–93 and accompanying text.
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officers were confiscating condoms, and what role that played in sex
workers’ decisions to carry them.95 The Department surveyed sixty-three
individuals involved in sex work.96 Of those people surveyed, 57 percent
had had condoms taken away from them by a police officer.97 The survey
also showed that 29 percent of those questioned had engaged in sex work at
least once without carrying condoms for fear of confrontation with police
officers.98 Despite these findings, the Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene, which originally stated that it supported pending legislation in the
New York State Senate to end the condoms-as-evidence policy, changed its
position.99 The Department now contends that the policy “has not resulted
in sex workers consistently failing to carry condoms because of fear of
arrest” and that they “have seen no evidence that the current law
undermines the public health aims of condom distribution.”100
c. New York Pending Legislation on Condoms As Evidence
Pending legislation in the New York State Senate proposes to outlaw the
police practice of taking condoms as evidence of prostitution.101 The bill
was passed by the New York State Assembly in June 2013, and is now
awaiting passage in the state senate and signature by the governor.102 This
bill would outlaw the use of condoms as evidence in any trial, hearing, or
proceeding concerning prostitution, and has been reproposed each term, but
has continually died in committee.103
2. The Practice of Taking Condoms As Evidence in Los Angeles
This section discusses California laws governing the policing of
prostitution before discussing the police policy in Los Angeles of taking
condoms as evidence from suspected sex workers.

95. PAUL KOBRAK, A REPORT TO THE NEW YORK CITY COMMISSIONER OF HEALTH, NEW
YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE 2 (2010).
96. Id. at 3.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 6.
99. Jim Dwyer, Giving Away, and Then Seizing, Condoms, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2012,
at A18.
100. Id.
101. S. 2013-S1379, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013), available at http://open.nysenate.gov/
legislation/bill/S1379-2013.
102. Assemb. 2013-A2736, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013), available at http://open.
nysenate.gov/legislation/bill/A2736-2013; see also New York: Assembly Passes Condom
Law, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 25, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/25/new-yorkassembly-passes-condom-law.
103. Id.
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a. California Laws Governing Prostitution and
Prostitution-Related Offenses
California law defines the act of prostitution as:
A person agrees to engage in an act of prostitution when, with specific
intent to so engage, he or she manifests an acceptance of an offer or
solicitation to so engage, regardless of whether the offer or solicitation
was made by a person who also possessed the specific intent to engage in
prostitution. No agreement to engage in an act of prostitution shall
constitute a violation of this subdivision unless some act, in addition to
the agreement, is done within this state in furtherance of the commission
of an act of prostitution by the person agreeing to engage in that act.104

California penal law also prohibits prevailing upon a person to visit a place
of prostitution,105 and purchasing a person for purposes of prostitution.106
b. Firsthand Accounts from Sex Workers in Los Angeles
Los Angeles has a similar policy to New York that allows police officers
to confiscate condoms from suspected sex workers, and “according to sex
workers in Los Angeles, condoms are commonly used as one of the bases
for arrest for prostitution.”107 One sex worker interviewed by Human
Rights Watch stated that police officers took six condoms out of her bag
and then arrested her, and that the condoms were part of the evidence that
was used to put her in jail.108 Another sex worker reported that “condoms
in purse” was listed on her arrest report, and that she no longer carries
condoms in her purse for fear of being arrested again.109
Sex workers in Los Angeles share a belief that carrying more than three
condoms is illegal.110 This belief is propagated by police officers who tell
sex workers that carrying more than three condoms will give the officers the
right to arrest them for prostitution.111 Human Rights Watch reports that
sex workers told outreach workers involved in HIV/AIDS prevention that
police tell them “that if they have more than two condoms in their purse,
they can be charged with an act of prostitution.”112 While police officers
have been known to espouse this belief, there is no rule in Los Angeles that
makes it illegal to carry more than three condoms.113

104. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (West 2010).
105. Id. § 318.
106. Id. § 266(e).
107. See MCLEMORE, supra note 1, at 47.
108. Id. at 48 (citing Interview by Human Rights Watch with Alessa N., in L.A., Cal.
(Mar. 13, 2012)).
109. Id. at 52 (citing Interview by Human Rights Watch with Serena L., in L.A., Cal.
(Mar. 14, 2012)).
110. Id. at 48.
111. Id. at 49. As one sex worker stated, “The police have told me, when you’re in a high
risk area, don’t carry more than three condoms on you because we can arrest you.” Id.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 48.
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c. Harassment of Outreach Workers Distributing Condoms
Outreach workers in Los Angeles also experience harassment at the
hands of the police when handing out condoms to sex workers.114 While
Los Angeles is concerned with stopping the spread of HIV/AIDS, even
enacting syringe exchange programs for drug users to prevent the spread of
the disease,115 police officers frequently stop and question outreach workers
when they are giving condoms to sex workers.116 One service provider
working on behalf of sex workers reported “that the outreach workers on
her staff had been stopped and questioned several times by the police for
distributing condoms.”117
d. Current Bill in the California State Legislature
A bill passed by the California State Assembly in May 2013 would
heighten the requirements for introducing condoms as evidence in the
prosecution of sex workers.118 The bill originally sought to ban the use of
condoms as evidence outright, but it was amended in assembly to achieve
the necessary two-thirds majority vote for passage.119 The bill requires
prosecutors who intend to introduce condoms into evidence to alert the
court and the defendant of the relevancy of the possession of condoms
before being allowed to submit them as evidence of prostitution.120
3. The System of Taking Condoms As Evidence As
Carried Out in Washington, D.C.
This section addresses the laws and policies that permit police officers in
Washington, D.C. to confiscate condoms from people they suspect of
engaging in sex work.
a. Washington, D.C. Laws Governing Prostitution and
Prostitution-Related Offenses
In Washington, D.C. it is a crime to engage in prostitution, which
criminal law statutes define as engaging in a “sexual act or contact with
another person in return for giving or receiving a fee.”121 The law also
prohibits soliciting prostitution, defined as to “invite, entice, offer,
persuade, or agree to engage in prostitution or address for the purpose of
inviting, enticing, offering, persuading, or agreeing to engage in
114. Id.
115. Syringe Exchange Programs, CITY OF L.A. AIDS COORDINATOR’S OFFICE,
http://disability.lacity.org/aids/syringe_exchange.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
116. See MCLEMORE, supra note 1, at 48.
117. Id.
118. Assemb. 2013-AB336, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013), available at http://legiscan.com/
CA/bill/AB336/2013.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. D.C. CODE § 22-2701.01 (2001).
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prostitution.”122 The District of Columbia also makes it illegal to compel a
person to engage in prostitution,123 receive money for arranging
prostitution,124 or to operate a house of prostitution.125
In 2005, the District of Columbia enacted a measure entitled the
Omnibus Public Safety Act, which provided for certain areas to be
designated as Prostitution Free Zones (PFZ) by the police department.126
Police officers can designate an area as a PFZ for up to 480 hours based on
a high incidence of arrest for prostitution in the recent past, or because of
verifiable evidence that there is a high incidence of prostitution occurring in
the area.127 The law allows officers to arrest people for congregating for
the purpose of prostitution and states that the totality of the circumstances
will be used to decide if a prostitution-related offense is occurring.128 Once
an area has been designated a PFZ, arrests in that area can be based on
circumstantial evidence, similar to what is allowed under New York’s
loitering for prostitution laws.129
b. Firsthand Accounts from Sex Workers in Washington, D.C.
In Washington, D.C., sex workers were most frequently targeted for
carrying condoms during brief stops to enforce antiprostitution laws.130
Sex workers in D.C. reported that police officers frequently questioned
them about why they were carrying so many condoms and often told
suspected sex workers to “throw [their] condoms in the garbage.”131 One
woman reported that after being stopped by a police officer, “[t]he cop told
me I could have three condoms and threw the others out, I had ten
altogether. Also, an open condom is a charge. I’ve been locked up for it,
the cops told me they were locking me up for an open condom.”132
Like their counterparts in Los Angeles,133 sex workers in Washington,
D.C. also spoke of a “three condom rule,” which had been communicated to
them either through fellow sex workers or through police officers in
exchanges such as the one detailed above.134 Outreach workers who were
interviewed by Human Rights Watch also commented on the apparent
122. Id.
123. Id. § 22-2705.
124. Id. § 22-2707.
125. Id. § 22-2712.
126. Id. § 22-2731.
127. Id. § 22-2731(b)(1).
128. Id. § 22-2731(d)(2); see also Dean Spade, The Only Way To End Racialized Gender
Violence in Prisons Is To End Prisons: A Response to Russell Robinson’s “Masculinity As
Prison,” 3 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 184, 193 (2012) (discussing how prostitution free zones
are used to enhance the policing of sex work).
129. D.C. CODE § 22-2731; see also supra Part I.D.1.a.
130. See MCLEMORE, supra note 1, at 37.
131. Id. at 39; see also ALLIANCE FOR A SAFE & DIVERSE D.C., MOVE ALONG: POLICING
SEX WORK IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 33 (2008), available at http://dctranscoalition.files.
wordpress.com/2010/05/movealongreport.pdf.
132. See MCLEMORE, supra note 1, at 40.
133. See supra Parts I.D.2, II.B.2.
134. See MCLEMORE, supra note 1, at 40.
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belief that having more than a few condoms could result in arrest or police
harassment, even though Washington, D.C. does not have a law or statute
that says police officers should confiscate condoms when a suspected sex
worker is carrying more than three.135
c. Harassment of Outreach Workers Distributing Condoms
Outreach workers themselves report being harassed by police officers for
distributing condoms to sex workers.136 In one instance, outreach workers
delivered condoms to a club known for prostitution.137 When they left the
club, police officers jumped out of nearby vans and demanded
identification.138 This type of interaction with police officers contributes to
the difficulty of distributing condoms to prostitutes.139
d. Recent Action by the Metro Police Department
The Washington, D.C. Metro Police Department (MPD) recently released
know-your-rights cards that clarified department policy on condoms.140
The cards state that having three condoms is not an offense, and that the
MPD supports the distribution of condoms for the prevention of sexually
transmitted diseases.141 The MPD also clarified that police may not
conduct a stop or a search based on the fact that a person has condoms.142
4. San Francisco’s Previous Policy on Confiscating Condoms
In 1994, San Francisco barred the use of condoms as evidence in
prostitution for a trial period, before permanently ceasing the confiscation
of condoms in 1995.143 Following extensive research by the San Francisco
Task Force on Prostitution, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors issued a
nonbinding resolution recommending that the San Francisco Police
Department and the district attorney cease confiscating condoms from
suspected sex workers or using them in the prosecution of prostitution
cases.144 The resolution specifically pointed to the fact that taking condoms
from suspected sex workers discouraged them from using protection, which
increased the risk of HIV/AIDS in direct opposition to the city’s policy on
HIV prevention.145 The resolution also emphasized that the public health
135. Id. at 39 (“Clients take fewer condoms than they need because they fear the
police.”).
136. See ALLIANCE FOR A SAFE & DIVERSE D.C., supra note 131, at 20.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 57.
140. Press Release, AIDS United, Advocacy Coalition Supports MPD Clarification of
Condom Policy (Mar. 11, 2013) (on file with Fordham Law Review).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. THE S.F. TASK FORCE ON PROSTITUTION, FINAL REPORT 23 (1996).
144. Id. at 11.
145. Id. at 10 (“Completely contrary to the policy of improving public health, the San
Francisco Police Department had a policy of confiscating condoms from people arrested for
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value of condoms for HIV prevention greatly outweighed the value to law
enforcement in enforcing prostitution laws.146
In response to the resolution, the District Attorney for San Francisco,
Arlo Smith, agreed to suspend the condoms-as-evidence policy for a trial
period.147 Smith pointed out to the Director of Public Health that condoms
were useful evidence in proving an act in furtherance of prostitution.148 In
1995, Smith’s office announced that they would permanently cease using
condoms as evidence of prostitution, without further explanation.149 While
police officers no longer take condoms, they do still photograph condoms to
use as evidence against suspected sex workers.150 This policy, while less
invasive than taking condoms outright, still inhibits sex workers’ ability to
carry condoms for fear that police officers will use the condoms against
them.151
II. IS THE STATE INTEREST IN POLICING PROSTITUTION SUFFICIENTLY
COMPELLING TO JUSTIFY THE INFRINGEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTIONS AFFORDED TO CONTRACEPTION?
While state officials have an interest in preventing prostitution in
accordance with state laws, the Supreme Court has found a constitutional
right to access and use contraception. Because taking condoms from sex
workers hinders their ability to access and use contraception, the police
policies may conflict with the constitutional right to contraception. If the
practice does conflict with the protections afforded to contraceptives under
Supreme Court jurisprudence, the state interest in taking the condoms must
be sufficiently compelling to justify the infringement of the fundamental
right, and the means of infringement must be narrowly tailored to the stated
goal.
Part II.A of this Note discusses the line of Supreme Court decisions
holding that the right to contraception is a fundamental privacy right. These
cases discuss when the state’s interest in denying contraception can
outweigh the need to protect a fundamental right, resulting in the state
action being declared constitutional. Part II.B examines the state interests
involved in taking condoms for evidence against suspected sex workers.
This section analyzes the necessity of using condoms in the policing and
prosecution of prostitution.

prostitution-related offenses. Many of the condoms taken had been given to street workers
by the City Department of Health.”).
146. See MCLEMORE, supra note 1, at 57.
147. Letter from Arlo Smith, S.F. Dist. Attorney, to Sandra Hernandez, Dir. of Pub.
Health (Sept. 6, 1994), available at http://www.bayswan.org/CondomsAsEvidence
SFTFP.pdf.
148. Id.
149. See THE S.F. TASK FORCE ON PROSTITUTION, supra note 143, at 23.
150. See MCLEMORE, supra note 1, at 60.
151. Id.
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A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Contraception
The Supreme Court has routinely held that the Constitution limits states’
ability to interfere with individuals’ privacy rights in the vein of family and
family planning, and the Court has similarly protected people’s right to
bodily integrity.152 The Court first recognized the right to privacy in
contraception in Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965, when it held
unconstitutional a Connecticut statute forbidding the use of
contraceptives.153 The Court found that forbidding contraceptive use for
married couples intruded on the right to marital privacy and autonomy in
decisions concerning reproductive choices.154 Over the next two decades,
the Court extended this privacy right to use contraceptives to individuals,155
and then shortly after concluded that restrictions on access to contraceptives
are also unconstitutional.156 This section will discuss the Supreme Court’s
five main decisions concerning contraception and family planning,
examining the fundamental right to privacy that the Supreme Court
addressed in Griswold and extended afterwards.157
1. Married Couples’ Protected Privacy Right in the Use
of Contraceptive Devices
In 1965, the Supreme Court first ruled on the right to possess
contraceptives for the sole purpose of preventing pregnancy, finding that
the state cannot interfere with that right without a compelling state
interest.158 In Griswold, the Supreme Court looked at a Connecticut statute
that forbid medical professionals from providing information about
contraception or contraceptive devices to married couples for the purpose of
preventing pregnancy.159 Connecticut state law did, however, permit the
use of contraceptives to prevent the spread of disease.160 Griswold
involved a married couple that consulted a doctor about the best way to

152. Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992); see also
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (holding that intrusive surgery to retrieve a bullet from
a robbery suspect’s chest was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (holding that state laws which forbid interracial marriages
were unconstitutional and violated people’s right to make decisions about their family);
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (holding that forcing a suspect who swallowed
drugs to ingest a substance to induce vomiting violated the defendant’s due process rights);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that an Oklahoma state penal law
that allowed people convicted of multiple felonies to be sterilized violated the equal
protection clause and was unconstitutional).
153. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
154. Id. at 485–86.
155. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
156. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (holding that when regulations
impose burdens on decisions as important as whether or not to bear a child, the state interest
must be sufficiently compelling to warrant adherence to the rule in light of infringing on
individuals privacy rights).
157. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 506.
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avoid conception.161 The doctor was examining married patients and
prescribing an appropriate birth control device or method, or giving general
advice on how to prevent conception.162 The state fined the doctor
according to a Connecticut statute that forbid the use of any drug or device
that prevented conception, in conjunction with a statute that forbid assisting
The doctor challenged the
in the commitment of any crime.163
constitutionality of the statute, claiming that it violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.164
The Supreme Court held that forbidding the use of contraceptives by
married couples was unconstitutional because it was an intrusion on the
right to marital privacy.165 Justice William O. Douglas, writing for the
Court, first looked to where the right to marital privacy originated,
discussing the Bill of Rights and finding that those rights have penumbras,
or extensions of privacy rights.166 He found the penumbras of privacy
rights to exist as emanations from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendment rights, describing these constitutional rights as creating zones
of privacy within which the right to marital privacy falls.167 Justice
Douglas noted that the Self-Incrimination Clause in the Fifth Amendment
creates a zone of privacy, so a citizen does not have to surrender to the
government to his detriment.168 He also emphasized that the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments protect against government intrusion into the home and
the “privacies of life.”169 The Court looked to its recent decisions
concerning Fourth Amendment law, recognizing that American citizens
respected individual privacy rights.170 Those rights extend to married

161. Id. at 479.
162. Id.
163. Id. The first statute states: “Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or
instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars
or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and
imprisoned.” The second statute states: “Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes,
hires or commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he
were the principal offender.” Id. at 480 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-32, 54-196 (1958)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 485–86.
166. Id. at 484; see also David Helscher, Griswold v. Connecticut and the Unenumerated
Right of Privacy, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 33, 35 (1994).
167. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. Justice Arthur J. Goldberg wrote a concurring opinion
highlighting the Ninth Amendment as the source of the right to marital privacy. Id. at 487
(Goldberg, J., concurring); see also Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., The Legacy of Griswold, 16
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 511, 523 (1989) (detailing how Justice Goldberg found that the Ninth
Amendment protects unenumerated rights through the Due Process Clause). Justice John
Marshall Harlan found the right to marital privacy to be protected under the liberty of the
Due Process Clause. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
168. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (majority opinion).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 484–85 (stating that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments provide “protection
against all governmental invasions ‘of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of
life’” (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886))); see also Akhil Reed Amar,
Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 811 n.195 (1994) (discussing
the Fourth Amendment as a source for privacy rights and emphasizing its use in Griswold).
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couples making decisions about whether to conceive a child, because
marriage is “a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by
several fundamental constitutional guarantees.”171
Having decided that married couples have a fundamental privacy right in
their ability to choose whether to use contraception, the Court considered
the statute at issue.172 Because the law completely forbid the use of
contraceptives, instead of attempting to regulate the sale of contraceptives,
the Court held the law to be overly broad.173 The Court stated that the
“governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms.”174 Because the law attempted to forbid all married couples from
using contraceptive methods and devices in violation of the expectation of
privacy guaranteed to married couples, the Court found the law
insufficiently narrowly tailored to pass the strict scrutiny standard, and
therefore unconstitutional.175
In an opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Arthur J. Goldberg
discussed the state interest in forbidding married couples’ access to
contraception.176 Listing the purpose of the statute as protecting marital
fidelity, Justice Goldberg found that while this interest was compelling, the
means taken to enforce the interest were not narrowly tailored.177 Because
Connecticut had statutes forbidding adultery and fornication, the statute’s
intrusion into marital privacy was unnecessary and therefore not precisely
tailored to the stated goal.178 Thus, the broadly sweeping statute was
unconstitutional, despite the state interest in protecting marital fidelity.179
This case was the first to lay out the right to privacy in decisions about the
use of contraceptives, and the Court continued to expand this right over the
next decade.180

171. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
172. Id.; see also Donald H.J. Hermann, Pulling the Fig Leaf Off the Right of Privacy:
Sex and the Constitution, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 909, 924 (2005).
173. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
174. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 337 U.S. 288, 307 (1964)) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional
Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 288 (1973).
175. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86 (“Would we allow the police to search the sacred
precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is
repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”).
176. Id. at 498 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
177. Id.
178. Id.; see also Robert E. L. Richardson, A Police Officer’s Legal, Consensual, OffDuty Sexual Relationship Is Not Protected by the Right of Privacy Under Either the Federal
or Texas Constitutions: City of Sherman v. Henry, 28 TEX. TECH L. REV. 187, 204 (1997)
(discussing Justice Goldberg’s analysis of adultery statutes as sufficient to protect against
marital infidelity, thus making the anticontraception law invalid).
179. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 498–99.
180. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, § 10.3, at 835–38.
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2. The Privacy Rights Inherent in Contraceptives
for Unmarried Individuals
Seven years after establishing married couples’ right to access
contraceptives, the Supreme Court considered the rights of unmarried
individuals to obtain and use contraception in Eisenstadt v. Baird.181 In
Eisenstadt, the Court struck down a Massachusetts statute that allowed only
married couples to obtain contraceptive devices, claiming that it violated
the rights of single people under the Equal Protection Clause.182 The Court
found that privacy rights are inherent in the individual; thus, because
married couples had a right to use contraceptive devices, individuals did as
well.183 The Court held, “If the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”184 Because the right to
access and use contraceptives was declared a fundamental right in
Griswold,185 the state had to demonstrate a compelling state interest in
forbidding unmarried individuals from obtaining contraception and that the
statute was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.186
The government argued that the purpose of the Massachusetts statute was
to discourage premarital sex.187 The Court found that purpose to be
inconsistent with the legislation and therefore invalid, stating that
Massachusetts could not possibly intend for unwanted pregnancy to serve
as a punishment for engaging in premarital sex.188 The ban on distribution
of contraceptives was only “marginally” related to the state’s purpose and
therefore could not be considered rationally related to an important
government purpose as required under a strict scrutiny analysis.189 The
government next argued that forbidding single people from accessing
contraception was a necessary health measure.190 Declaring this argument
invalid, the Court cited the fact that contraceptives are not dangerous, and
that doctors are able to effectively supply them to married couples,
therefore forbidding that same access to single persons was
discriminatory.191 Moreover, because almost no health risks exist in taking
181. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
182. Id. at 441–43.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 453.
185. See supra notes 165–71 and accompanying text; see also Hermann, supra note 172,
at 924 (noting that Justice William J. Brennan’s analysis of Griswold implies that sexual
privacy is a fundamental right protected from interference by anticontraceptive statutes).
186. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 452–54; see supra notes 38–45 and accompanying text.
187. Id. at 448.
188. Id.; see also Yao Apasu-Gbotsu et al., Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy
in the Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521, 558 (1986).
189. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 448; see also Kathleen A. Ward, A Dose of Reality: The
Prescription for a Limited Constitutional Right to Privacy in Pharmaceutical Records Is
Examined in Douglas v. Dobbs, 12 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 73, 88 (2008).
190. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 451–52.
191. Id. at 451; see also Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition: From Griswold to
Eisenstadt and Beyond, 82 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1544 (1994).
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contraception, the law was overly broad and did not fulfill the government’s
stated purpose.192 The Court found that prohibiting pharmacists from
distributing condoms served no legitimate government purpose, even when
the state construed the action as necessary as a health measure.193 In a
footnote, Justice William J. Brennan noted that the government purpose
was not even sufficient to overcome rational basis review under the Equal
Protection analysis, let alone meet the heightened standard of strict scrutiny
necessary for the fundamental right to make decisions about contraception
established in Griswold.194
3. The Fundamental Privacy Right To Make Decisions
About Family Planning
In Carey v. Population Services International195 the Supreme Court
examined a New York State law that prohibited the selling or distribution of
contraceptives to anyone under the age of sixteen.196 The law also forbid
the distribution of contraceptives to persons over the age of fifteen by
anyone but a licensed pharmacist.197 Finally, the law prohibited the
advertisement or display of any contraceptive device.198 After reviewing
the cases which established autonomy in choices of procreation as a
fundamental right—and drawing on the language used in Eisenstadt199—the
Supreme Court held that “where a decision as fundamental as that whether
to bear or beget a child is involved, regulations imposing a burden on it may
be justified only by compelling state interests, and must be narrowly drawn
to express only those interests.”200 The Court found that limiting the
distribution of nonprescription contraceptives to only licensed pharmacists
placed a heavy burden on individuals who wished to purchase and use
contraception.201 Even though the burden was not as great as would be
imposed by a total ban on contraception, it was significant enough to limit
access to contraception and stifle price competition, and, therefore, the law
was an overly broad intrusion on a fundamental privacy right that could not
survive the strict scrutiny test.202
In Carey, the Court considered the state interest in depth, concluding that
none of the justifications offered by the state were sufficiently compelling
to permit interference with a fundamental right.203 The appellants argued
that limiting the sale of contraceptives to only pharmacists helped keep
192. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 451–52.
193. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, § 10.3, at 837.
194. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 447 n.7.
195. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
196. Id. at 681.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See supra Part II.A.2.
200. Carey, 431 U.S. at 686.
201. Id. at 689; see also Vanessa Lu, The Plan B Age Restriction Violates a Minor’s Right
To Access Contraceptives, 44 FAM. L.Q. 391, 398 (2010).
202. Carey, 431 U.S. at 689.
203. Id. at 686–702.
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young people from selling contraceptives, worked to protect contraceptive
devices from being tampered with, and facilitated the enforcement of other
parts of the statute concerning contraceptives.204 None of these arguments
were sufficient for the Court to find a compelling state interest.205
In analyzing the state’s first argument, the Court found that the statute
forbidding the sale of contraceptives by anyone other than a pharmacist was
not substantially related to the stated goal of preventing young people from
selling contraceptives.206 The Court also found that pharmacists are not
better able to prevent tampering with contraceptives than any other person,
and, therefore, the stated goal of the statute was not a sufficiently
compelling state interest to justify an intrusion into a fundamental right.207
Finally, the Court pointed out that a state’s desire to avoid enacting more
administrative regulations, such as to prevent tampering with contraception,
had never been found to be a sufficiently compelling reason to interfere
with a constitutional right.208 The lack of a compelling state interest left the
Court no choice but to strike down the statute.209
In analyzing the statute, which prohibited the sale of contraceptives to
anyone under the age of fifteen, the Court again found that the state interest
was not sufficiently compelling to justify the interference with the
fundamental right to contraception.210 The appellants argued that the
statute was constitutional as an effort in furtherance of New York State
policies prohibiting minors from engaging in promiscuous sex.211 The
Court first noted that despite the ability of states to make laws for minors
that were more restrictive than those for adults, outright prohibitions on
minors’ ability to obtain abortions and mandatory parental consent
requirements had recently been found to be unconstitutional.212 While the
Court was willing to give credence to the argument that preventing teenage
promiscuity was important, it was not a sufficiently compelling state
interest to justify the burden on access to contraceptives imposed by the
statute.213 Because excluding minors from accessing contraceptives was
not in any way linked to decreasing teenage promiscuity, the Court found
that the law was not related to a sufficiently compelling government

204. Id. at 690.
205. Id. at 691.
206. Id. at 690–91.
207. Id. at 691.
208. Id.; see also Angela Patterson, Carey v. Population Services International: Minors’
Rights To Access Contraceptives, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 469, 471 (2004).
209. Carey, 431 U.S. at 690–91.
210. Id. at 695–96.
211. Id. at 692.
212. Id. at 693 (citing Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74
(1976) (holding that outright prohibitions on minors obtaining abortions was
unconstitutional)); see also Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, The Failure of AbstinenceOnly Education: Minors Have a Right to Honest Talk About Sex, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
12, 52 (2006) (explaining that Carey lays out the protections for minors procreative rights).
213. Carey, 431 U.S. at 694–95; see also Patterson, supra note 208, at 472 (noting that
even the appellants conceded that limiting access to contraceptives was not likely to stop
young people from engaging in sexual intercourse).
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purpose.214 Despite the appellant’s argument that the statute still permitted
physicians to sell contraceptives to minors, the Court found the burden on
the fundamental right to be too great to survive strict scrutiny.215 By
applying the strict scrutiny standard, the Court affirmed its previous
decisions in Griswold and Eisenstadt, recognizing that choices about
contraceptive use and family planning were fundamental privacy rights.216
4. Constitutionally Protected Privacy Rights Extended to Abortion
In Roe v. Wade,217 the Supreme Court extended the privacy rights
identified in Griswold and Eisenstadt to include a woman’s right to obtain
an abortion.218 Roe was a challenge to a Texas statute that prohibited the
termination of a pregnancy except in cases of risk to the mother’s life.219
Justice Harry A. Blackmun, writing for the Court, proceeded through an indepth discussion of the history of abortion and the right to privacy,
ultimately concluding that the right to obtain an abortion was a fundamental
right.220 He spent a considerable period of time discussing the right to
reproductive autonomy.221 The Court concluded that the right to privacy,
“whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal
liberty and restrictions upon state action . . . [or] in the Ninth Amendment’s
reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a
woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”222 The
Court held that the Texas statute criminalized abortion too broadly by
outlawing abortion except in the case of a life-saving procedure for the
mother.223 While the Court recognized two important state interests—the
protection of maternal health and the interest in the life of the fetus—neither

214. Carey, 431 U.S. at 696 (“[W]hen a State, as here, burdens the exercise of a
fundamental right, its attempt to justify that burden as a rational means for the
accomplishment of some significant state policy requires more than a bare assertion, based
on a conceded complete absence of supporting evidence, that the burden is connected to such
a policy.”).
215. Id. at 697.
216. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, § 10.3, at 838 (explaining that for the government
to justify any law that restricts access to contraception, the strict scrutiny standard must be
met). The Court clarified the right they were establishing by stating that the violation was
not occurring “because there is an independent fundamental ‘right of access to
contraceptives,’ but because such access is essential to exercise of the constitutionally
protected right of decision in matters of childbearing that is the underlying foundation of the
holdings in Griswold, Eisenstadt v. Baird, and Roe v. Wade.” Carey, 431 U.S. at 688–89.
The Court’s opinions in total have been read to establish a fundamental right to use and
purchase contraception, requiring any state interference with that right to meet the strict
scrutiny standard. See, e.g., Davis & Lansing, supra note 40, at 86; Prothro, supra note 40, at
721.
217. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
218. Id. at 154.
219. Id. at 120–21.
220. Id. at 130–52.
221. Id.; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, § 10.3, at 840.
222. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
223. Id. at 164.
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of these interests were sufficiently compelling to outlaw abortion at all
stages of pregnancy.224
The state argued that the ability to recognize and protect the fetus was a
compelling state interest that justified infringement on the right to privacy
in procreation.225 The Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not
include unborn fetuses in the definition of “person,” so the state could not
argue that the right to protect the life of the fetus was sufficient to ban
abortion at all stages of pregnancy.226 In deciding when the life of the fetus
was sufficiently compelling to justify a ban on abortion, the Court found
that during the first trimester, the state has no compelling interest in the life
of the fetus because it would not be viable outside of the woman,227 and
forcing a woman to carry a child to term greatly burdens the mother.228
However, the state interest changes as the fetus develops and becomes
viable.229 The state interest becomes compelling only at viability, or once
the fetus could survive outside the mother.230 It is at this point that the state
may proscribe abortion in the interest of protecting life, because the state
interest in the life of the fetus is sufficiently compelling to be balanced
against the privacy rights of the mother.231
In considering the state interest in maternal health, the Court found that
the state does have an interest in regulating abortion procedures for the
protection of the health of the mother.232 This interest only becomes
compelling after the first trimester, where the risks associated with
obtaining an abortion are higher than with continuing to carry the fetus.233
Even after finding the state interest in maternal health to be compelling after
the first trimester, the Court still limited the type of regulations states could
impose on abortion to those substantially related to the goal of protecting
the mother.234

224. Id. at 163–64; see also John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on
Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 920–21 (1973).
225. Roe, 410 U.S. at 156.
226. Id. at 157.
227. Id. at 163.
228. Id. at 153 (“The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by
denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable
even in early pregnancy may be involved.”).
229. Id. at 162–63; see also Judith G. Waxman, Privacy and Reproductive Rights: Where
We’ve Been and Where We’re Going, 68 MONT. L. REV. 299, 306–07 (2007) (explaining that
government interests grow as the woman’s pregnancy continues).
230. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
231. Id. at 163–64; see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of
Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 976 (1987) (discussing the apparent balancing the Court
proposes to undertake when conducting constitutional analysis).
232. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
233. Id.
234. Id. The Court pointed to very specific interests that the state could cite in line with
protecting the mother’s health, including: “requirements as to the qualifications of the
person who is to perform the abortion; as to the licensure of that person; as to the facility in
which the procedure is to be performed, that is, whether it must be a hospital or may be a
clinic or some other place of less-than-hospital status; as to the licensing of the facility; and
the like.” Id.
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5. The Most Recent Iteration of the Right To Have an Abortion
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,235 the
Supreme Court affirmed their previous decision in Roe that abortion was a
protected fundamental privacy right; however, they reconsidered the state
interests in fetal viability and the test for analyzing a state’s interest.236 The
Court held that strict scrutiny was too stringent a standard of review for
regulations concerning abortion, and that the state interest must be analyzed
under an undue burden framework.237 The Court found that it is “[o]nly
where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to
make this decision [that] the power of the State reach[es] into the heart of
the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”238 The Court concluded
that state regulations may encourage women to carry a fetus to term, as the
state has some interest in the life of the fetus, without infringing on the
woman’s privacy interest in making decisions about contraception.239 The
Court noted, however, that any such regulation must only be in place to
help inform a woman’s choice in deciding whether to carry the baby to
term, and could not be used to hinder that free choice.240 The Court would
consider any substantial interference with the right to obtain an abortion
unconstitutional if it is not backed by a compelling state interest sufficient
to meet strict scrutiny.241
In analyzing the Pennsylvania law under the undue burden standard, the
Court upheld a twenty-four-hour waiting period before obtaining an
abortion, the requirement that women be informed of the detailed
information available about the fetus, and extensive reporting and record
keeping requirements for doctors.242 The Court struck down the spousal
notification provision as unconstitutional, arguing that it would prevent a
significant number of women from obtaining an abortion, and therefore
posed an undue burden on the woman’s right of free choice.243 While the
undue burden standard is not as rigorous as strict scrutiny, the Court
affirmed the privacy interests inherent in the right to make decisions about
contraception and family planning.244 Moreover, when deciding to place

235. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
236. Id. at 870.
237. Id. at 873–74.
238. Id. at 874.
239. Id. at 872–73; see also Waxman, supra note 229, at 309.
240. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. But see Linda J. Wharton et al., Preserving the Core of Roe:
Reflections on Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 353 (2006)
(explaining that many federal courts have manipulated the undue burden standard in ways
that undermine the protections guaranteed by Roe and Casey).
241. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
242. Id. at 879–901; see also Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of
Undue Burden Analysis in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 879 (1994)
(discussing how the Court in Casey applies the undue burden standard as a complete
substitute for analyzing state interests, never once mentioning strict scrutiny or even rational
basis review).
243. Casey, 505 U.S. at 892–95.
244. Id.
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more limits on abortion, the Court did so because of the state interest in
preserving fetal life.245
B. Police Officers in New York City, Los Angeles, and Washington, D.C.
Confiscate Condoms from Suspected Sex Workers To
Enforce Antiprostitution Laws
This section lays out the police practice of confiscating condoms from
suspected sex workers in three locations under three different sets of state
laws. The section then discusses the state interest behind the practice of
taking condoms as necessary for the enforcement of antiprostitution laws.
1. New York City Police Practice and Rationale
As described in Part I, police officers in New York City take condoms
from sex workers, sometimes for the purpose of use as evidence, sometimes
simply to throw the condoms away.246 As state actors entrusted with the
safety of the public, police officers in New York City have an interest in
preventing prostitution in accordance with the New York Penal Code,
which prohibits prostitution, promoting prostitution, patronizing
prostitution, and loitering for purposes of prostitution.247 In accordance
with the stop-and-frisk doctrine discussed above, police officers may stop
persons suspected of prostitution if there is reasonable suspicion that they
are engaged in one of the above-listed acts.248 It is during these encounters
for the purpose of policing prostitution that officers confiscate condoms
from suspected sex workers.249 After an arrest occurs, the New York Police
Department Patrol Guide lists factors which officers should list on arrest
reports when processing an arrest for prostitution.250 Those factors include:
the length of time the officer observed a suspect, the action that caused the
arrest, the location of the officer when the arrest occurred, the attire of the
suspect, and any other necessary information.251 When making an arrest
for loitering for prostitution, the factors also include the conduct and
clothing of the arrestee and whether or not the person is a known
prostitute.252 The Patrol Guide also states that when an officer is making an
arrest for prostitution based on an overheard conversation, the officer

245. See Elizabeth A. Reilly, The Rhetoric of Disrespect: Uncovering the Faulty
Premises Infecting Reproductive Rights, 5 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 147, 153 (1996)
(discussing the moral reasoning behind the limits on abortion in Casey, stating that “[w]hat
emerged was a still-recognized but diminished right of a woman to choose abortion, a right
which frequently paled in comparison to an increasingly valued state interest in preserving
fetal life”).
246. See supra Part I.D.1.a.
247. See supra Part I.D.1.a.
248. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that police officers may conduct
limited stops based on reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is occurring).
249. See supra Part I.D.
250. N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, PATROL GUIDE §§ 208-44 to -45 (2007).
251. Id. § 208-44.
252. Id. § 208-45.
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should add loitering for prostitution to the charges against the suspect.253
New York City’s Prostitution Complaint Forms provide space for police
officers to write down how many condoms they found on a person
suspected of engaging in prostitution or prostitution-related offenses.254
The borough of Brooklyn’s Prostitution Complaint Form contains a specific
line that reads “(fill in number) _______ condoms” under a section where
police officer can include additional information that indicates a suspect
was engaged in or attempting to engage in prostitution.255
The Office of the District Attorney for the borough of Queens, New York
stated that condoms “are useful items of evidence in prostitution-related
offenses, and banning condoms as evidence ‘would seriously damage . . .
cases.’”256 The office pointed to the fact that condoms frequently serve as
evidence in situations where prostitutes are victims of exploitation, such as
in sex trafficking cases, or attempts to close brothels.257 In regard to these
cases, the office estimated that of seven sex trafficking cases and sixty-five
cases for prostitution-related offenses, condoms were expected to be part of
the prosecution’s evidence in two of the cases.258 A report by the Columbia
Law School Sexuality and Gender Law Clinic found that condoms were
used as evidence in thirty-nine cases.259 In discussing why condoms should
be confiscated to serve as evidence, the Queens District Attorney’s office
also pointed to the fact that pimps frequently facilitate prostitution by
providing condoms, so collecting them as evidence can be useful in
prosecuting pimps as well.260
In cases concerning prostitution, the prosecutor must prove that a person
is engaging in or attempting to engage in a sexual act for a fee.261 For
example, in People v. Benjamin,262 a woman was charged with engaging in
prostitution after exchanging emails with an undercover police officer,
during which she specified the time and place they should meet for her to
provide a massage for the cost of $200.263 When the officer met the
253. Id.
254. See MCLEMORE, supra note 1, at 91–100.
255. Id. at 98. In May 2013, Charles J. Hynes, the Brooklyn District Attorney, told police
officers that the Brooklyn District Attorney’s office would no longer use condoms as
evidence in prostitution and loitering for prostitution cases. See J. David Goodman, Police in
Brooklyn Are Told Not To Seize Condoms of Prostitutes, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2011, at A30.
256. McLemore, supra note 1, at 31. But see COLUMBIA LAW SCH. SEXUALITY & GENDER
LAW CLINIC, NO CONDOMS AS EVIDENCE: A CRITICAL STEP TO PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH
8 (2010), available at http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/clinics/
sexuality-gender/images/criminal5.pdf (explaining that condoms are not probative evidence
of prostitution because the question in a prostitution case is whether sex was exchanged for a
fee, and condoms offer no proof that a fee was exchanged).
257. See MCLEMORE, supra note 1, at 31.
258. Id.
259. See COLUMBIA LAW SCH. SEXUALITY & GENDER LAW CLINIC, supra note 256, at 9
n.59 (stating that in one borough of New York, over a two year period, condoms served as
evidence of prostitution in thirty-nine cases).
260. See MCLEMORE, supra note 1, at 31.
261. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
262. 860 N.Y.S.2d 899 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2008).
263. Id. at 901.
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defendant and asked if she would perform sexual services for him during
the massage, she stated that the $200 fee included sexual services.264 It was
this exchange of a fee for sexual acts that resulted in the defendant’s charge
for engaging in prostitution.265
While police officers take condoms as evidence, one judge has refused to
accept them as evidence of prostitution in court. Because most cases
involving charges for prostitution are handled outside of court, it is very
rare for a prostitution case to make it to the courthouse.266 In a rare case
that made it to court over a prostitution charge, Judge Richard M. Weinberg
of the Criminal Court of the City of New York refused to allow the
prosecutor to enter the condoms as evidence.267 Judge Weinberg stated, “I
don’t care about the condoms. This is the 21st Century.”268 After the
prosecutor voiced his objection and argued that the condoms were
“circumstantial evidence of defendant’s intent,” the judge declared that it
was also the intent of “every other woman and man who wants to protect
themselves in the age of AIDS.”269 The judge ruled that the condoms were
not probative of any crime, and therefore refused to admit them as
evidence.270
2. Confiscation of Condoms As Carried Out by
Police Officers in Los Angeles
The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) confiscates condoms as
evidence of prostitution in line with their enforcement of antiprostitution
laws.271 According to the LAPD’s documentation of arrests, prostitution
offenses most often result in a complaint being sought. In 2010, 4,775
adults were arrested on prostitution related offenses; misdemeanor
complaints were entered against 4,716 of those people.272 In 2011, 3,833
adults were arrested for prostitution-related offenses, and complaints were
sought in all 3,833 arrests.273 The LAPD stated that it “maintain[s] a strong
enforcement campaign against prostitution, largely in response to citizen

264. Id.
265. Id. at 900.
266. See MCLEMORE, supra note 1, at 14.
267. Id. at 16.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. THE PROS NETWORK & SEX WORKERS PROJECT, PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS: THE IMPACT
OF USING CONDOMS AS EVIDENCE OF PROSTITUTION IN NEW YORK CITY 12 (2012), available
at http://sexworkersproject.org/downloads/2012/20120417-public-health-crisis.pdf.
271. See MCLEMORE, supra note 1, at 54.
272. L.A. POLICE DEP’T, INFO. TECH. DIV., MGMT. REPORT UNIT, Statistical Digest 3.8
(2010), available at http://www.lapdonline.org/crime_mapping_and_compstat/content_
basic_view/9098 (click the “Statistical Digest” hyperlink under the 2010 heading).
273. L.A. POLICE DEP’T, APPLICATION DEV. & SUPPORT DIV., MGMT. REPORT UNIT,
Statistical Digest 9.4 (2011), available at http://www.lapdonline.org/crime_mapping_
and_compstat/content_basic_view/9098 (click the “Statistical Digest” hyperlink under the
2011 heading).
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complaints about the activity occurring in their neighborhoods.”274 The
LAPD lieutenant in charge of the Special Enforcement Division stated that
condoms are useful evidence in proving that a person is loitering for
prostitution or is engaging in an act in furtherance of prostitution.275 While
the officer expressed concern that sex workers might not use condoms for
fear of arrest, and denied a policy that two or three condoms was enough for
an officer to initiate an arrest, he “defended condoms as targets of stops and
searches of persons suspected of prostitution, stating that ‘the average
citizen isn’t walking around with condoms in their pocket.’”276
When speaking with Human Rights Watch, the Office of the City
Attorney of Los Angeles said that condoms are “routinely catalogued” as
evidence and are introduced at trial to support prostitution charges;
however, they are not a focal point of filing charges against suspected sex
workers.277 The deputy chief of the Safe Neighborhoods and Gang
Division stated that condoms are “particularly probative evidence where
there [are] a large number of condoms in someone’s possession or at a
business site such as a massage parlor.”278 The deputy chief emphasized
that Los Angeles did not wish to discourage condom use, and that there had
been no evidence that this was occurring among sex workers.279 The
deputy chief also pointed out that it was very “rare” to arrest a person for
prostitution and not find condoms on his or her person, which highlights the
state interest involved in the practice of using condoms as evidence of
prostitution.280
3. The Police Practice of Taking Condoms As Evidence
of Prostitution in Washington, D.C.
Police officers in Washington D.C. are similarly tasked with enforcing
the prohibition of prostitution.281 Assistant Chief of Police Peter Newsham
explained that “prostitution cases are not a high priority” and that most
arrests for prostitution in the D.C. area arise out of complaints from
members of the public.282 Officials in Washington, D.C., while expressing
concern for the fact that condoms-as-evidence policies might discourage
condom use among sex workers, stated that condoms can be used as
supplementary evidence of prostitution when collected incident to an

274. See MCLEMORE, supra note 1, at 54; Dakota Smith, LAPD, Community Vow To Stop
Prostitution on Lankershim Boulevard, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 13, 2012, 9:00 PM),
http://www.dailynews.com/general-news/20120314/lapd-community-vow-to-stopprostitution-on-lankershim-boulevard.
275. See MCLEMORE, supra note 1, at 54.
276. Id. at 54.
277. Id. at 54–55.
278. Id. at 55.
279. Id. at 54.
280. Id.
281. See supra Part I.D.3.
282. MCLEMORE, supra note 1, at 41; see also ALLIANCE FOR A SAFE & DIVERSE D.C.,
supra note 131, at 16.
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arrest.283 Assistant Chief Newsham spoke to the importance of collecting
condoms as evidence to prosecute human trafficking cases.284 He “asserted
that condoms may be helpful as supplementary evidence in [human
trafficking] cases and will continue to be collected at the scene.”285
However, Assistant Chief Newsham was concerned that police officers
were “editorializing” about the number of condoms a person could legally
carry, particularly in a way that made suspected sex workers feel threatened
that simply possessing condoms could lead to arrest.286 He emphasized the
fact that searches of suspected sex workers could only be made if probable
cause for arrest exists at the time of the search.287
In 2011, the Metropolitan Police Department reported 940 arrests of
adults for prostitution or commercialized vice.288 This number was lower
than the reported arrests in 2010 for prostitution, which amounted to 1,409
arrests of adults.289 In 2012, the number of adult arrests for prostitution
was even lower, coming in at 619.290
While police officers take condoms from suspected sex workers for
evidentiary purposes, these condoms are not always admitted in trials.291
Judge Linda Kay Davis, who heads the special prostitution docket in
Washington, D.C., said that she has never seen condoms actually entered
into evidence in individual prostitution cases in the two years she has been
presiding over the docket.292
III. THE STATE INTEREST IN POLICING PROSTITUTION IS NOT
SUFFICIENTLY COMPELLING TO JUSTIFY THE INFRINGEMENT OF THE
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO ACCESS CONTRACEPTIVES
As discussed above, once the Supreme Court identifies a fundamental
right, laws cannot interfere with that constitutional right unless they are
sufficiently compelling and narrowly tailored to the state’s interest. This
Part argues that there is a fundamental right to contraception, and that the
police do not have a sufficiently compelling state interest in policing
prostitution to justify the confiscation of condoms from suspected sex
workers. Part III.A discusses the fundamental right for sex workers to use
and access condoms. Part III.B argues that police officers confiscation of
condoms from sex workers violates that fundamental right. Part III.C
argues that the state interest in policing prostitution is not sufficiently
283. MCLEMORE, supra note 1, at 41.
284. Id. at 42.
285. Id.
286. Id.; see also ALLIANCE FOR A SAFE & DIVERSE D.C., supra note 131, at 57.
287. MCLEMORE, supra note 1, at 42; see also supra Part I.B.
288. METRO. POLICE DEP’T, ANNUAL REPORT 2011, at 28 (2012), available at http://mpdc.
dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/mpdc/publication/attachments/ar_2011_0.pdf.
289. Id.
290. METRO. POLICE DEP’T, ANNUAL REPORT 2012, at 30 (2013), available at http://mpdc.
dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/mpdc/publication/attachments/2012_AR_1.pdf. The 2012
data calculation did not include commercialized vice with prostitution. Id.
291. MCLEMORE, supra note 1, at 42
292. Id.
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compelling to allow the police to infringe on that fundamental right.
Finally, Part III.D argues that the confiscation of condoms for use as
evidence is not the least restrictive or least discriminatory alternative
available to police officers. Because the state interest is not sufficiently
compelling and the state action is not narrowly tailored, taking condoms to
use as evidence against sex workers is unconstitutional.293
A. There Is a Fundamental Right To Access and Use Contraceptives
The cases of Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey establish a fundamental
right to contraceptive use free from overly burdensome state interference.294
In Griswold, the Supreme Court recognized a fundamental right to marital
privacy in decisions about whether to use contraceptives.295 The Court
extended this right in Eisenstadt, finding that unmarried individuals have a
privacy right to access and use contraception.296 In Carey, the Court once
again protected the access and use of contraception as a fundamental right,
finding that states cannot limit a minor’s access to contraceptives.297 Going
even further to protect the fundamental right to contraception, in Roe and
Casey the Supreme Court upheld a woman’s right to choose to terminate
her pregnancy through abortion.298 These Supreme Court cases establish a
fundamental right to access and use contraception. Sex workers carry
condoms to use as protection against HIV/AIDS, other sexually transmitted
diseases, and unwanted pregnancy.299 Sex workers have a fundamental
right to access and use condoms and that right cannot be infringed upon
unless a compelling state interest is at stake and the method of enforcement
of that interest is narrowly tailored.300
B. Police Policies Constitute an Infringement on the Fundamental
Right To Access and Use Contraceptives
Taking condoms from suspected sex workers deprives them of the ability
to access and use contraceptives.301 Because the Supreme Court has
established a fundamental right to use contraceptives, law enforcement
confiscation of condoms as evidence constitutes an infringement on that
right and must satisfy strict scrutiny.302 In Griswold, the Supreme Court
struck down a state statute that allowed contraceptive use for the purpose of
preventing disease but not for preventing pregnancy.303 When simply
limiting access to condoms constitutes a substantial interference with a

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part II.A.1–3.
See supra notes 157–75 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 181–94 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 195–214 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.4–5.
See supra notes 41–46 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 41–47 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.C.1–3.
See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 160–71 and accompanying text
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fundamental right, as the Supreme Court held in Carey, taking condoms
from sex workers and depriving them of access to contraceptives constitutes
an even greater infringement on the fundamental right.304 Taking condoms
from suspected sex workers is only constitutional if it is narrowly tailored
and done for a sufficiently compelling state purpose.305
C. State Actors Do Not Have a Sufficiently Compelling State Interest To
Justify the Infringement on the Fundamental Right to Contraceptives
The police practice of taking condoms to use as evidence in New York
City, Los Angeles, and Washington, D.C. is not conducted for a sufficiently
compelling state interest to justify the interference with the fundamental
right to make family planning decisions and use contraceptives.306 Police
officers confiscate condoms for the purpose of using them as evidence in
the prosecution of suspected sex workers.307 Prosecutors, however, are not
using the condoms as evidence.308 In some cases, police officers are simply
taking the condoms to throw in the trash.309 A compelling state interest
must be the actual purpose behind a state action, and the Supreme Court has
never stated what exactly constitutes a compelling state interest.310
The Court has identified a compelling state interest in the protection of
the country during wartime,311 in ensuring the safety of children,312 in the
protection of the health of a pregnant woman, and in the life of a fetus once
it has reached viability.313 Invading a fundamental right simply to aid in the
prosecution of criminal laws is not a sufficiently compelling interest when
measured against interests the Court has previously found compelling.314
The protection of life and country are much more compelling governmental
goals than enforcing nonviolent criminal laws in a way that infringes on a
fundamental right.315 Moreover, all three cities are currently questioning
the practice of taking condoms as evidence, thereby demonstrating that
there is not a compelling reason to continue the action.316 Because the state
interest is not compelling, taking condoms from suspected sex workers is an
unconstitutional infringement of a fundamental right.317
In New York, the state interest in fighting HIV/AIDS has led the
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene to give out free condoms
throughout New York City, where there is a heightened occurrence of

304.
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307.
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See supra notes 206–10 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.A.4.
See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.1–3.
See supra notes 291–92 and accompanying text.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.4–5.
See supra notes 311–13 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.B.1–2.
See supra Part I.D.1.c, I.D.2.d., I.D.3.d.
See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
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HIV/AIDS.318 Taking condoms from people who are engaged in sex work
is directly in opposition to the state’s interest in protecting health.319 While
police officers have a state interest in upholding antiprostitution laws, the
small number of cases that actually make it to court where the condoms
could be used as evidence is too low to justify the infringement on the
fundamental right.320
The Queens District Attorney estimated that of seventy-two cases for
prostitution-related offenses, condoms were expected to be part of the
prosecution’s evidence in a mere 2.77 percent of the cases.321 Moreover, a
state court judge’s refusal to accept condoms as evidence further indicates a
divide between the constitutional right to be free from state interference
with a fundamental right and the legitimate government purpose.322 If the
courts are unwilling to admit the evidence, then the confiscated condoms no
longer serve the government purpose of enforcing antiprostitution laws.323
The Supreme Court has found a state interference with a fundamental
right to be valid during times of war or when necessary for the protection of
children.324 The interest in carrying out ordinary criminal law enforcement
will not justify the infringement of the fundamental right to contraception,
particularly when the evidence so rarely makes it to court.
In Washington, D.C. and Los Angeles, outreach workers experience
harassment at the hands of police officers for distributing condoms to sex
workers.325 The Supreme Court established a right to advertise for and
distribute condoms when it stated in Carey that limiting the access to
distribution of contraceptives was sufficient to constitute an
unconstitutional violation of a fundamental privacy right.326 Police officers
cannot argue that they are confiscating condoms from outreach workers to
use in the enforcement of antiprostitution laws.327 Because there is no
compelling state interest in prohibiting outreach workers from distributing
condoms, police officers’ infringement on the right to contraception is
unconstitutional.328

318. NYC Condom: Why Use Them?, N.Y.C. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/living/nyc-condoms.shtml (last visited Oct. 21, 2013)
(detailing how condoms should be used because they prevent both diseases and pregnancy).
319. Id.
320. See supra notes 258–60 and accompanying text.
321. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
322. See supra Part I.B.1.
323. See supra notes 266–70, 291–92 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 48–55 and accompanying text.
325. See supra Part I.B.2–3.
326. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 689 (1977) (striking down a statute
that restricted the distribution channels for obtaining contraception because limiting public
access to contraceptive devices interfered with the fundamental right to make decisions
regarding family planning).
327. See supra notes 114–17, 134–35 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.

1088

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

D. The Government Action Is Not Narrowly Tailored to the Goal of
Policing and Prosecuting Prostitution
Not only is the state interest in enforcing criminal laws not sufficiently
compelling to justify an infringement of a fundamental right, the police
practice is not narrowly tailored to the purpose of policing prostitution.
Any infringement on a fundamental right must be narrowly tailored, and
“the fit between the government’s action and its asserted purposed [must]
be ‘as perfect as practicable.’”329 The police practices in New York City,
Los Angeles, and Washington, D.C. are not narrowly tailored to the goal of
policing prostitution because police officers do not need to deprive sex
workers of access to condoms to enforce antiprostitution laws.330 Sex
workers may still engage in sex work even if their condoms have been
confiscated, demonstrating that taking condoms does not stop prostitution
from occurring.331 Moreover, it is not necessary for police officers to take
the condoms if the goal is to use them as evidence against suspected sex
workers.332
The policy changes enacted by the city of San Francisco demonstrate that
confiscation of condoms is not necessary to use those condoms as
evidence.333 The city of San Francisco previously had a policy that allowed
police officers to confiscate condoms from suspected sex workers.334 The
district attorney permanently banned the use of condoms as evidence of
prostitution in 1994.335 Currently, San Francisco law prohibits police
officers from taking condoms, and only allows them to photograph the
condoms found on persons suspected of engaging in prostitution.336 While
this policy still causes fear of interactions with police officers and
discourages sex workers from carrying condoms, it demonstrates that states
do not need to confiscate the condoms to use them as potential evidence.337
This type of police action is also not narrowly tailored because condoms
are not probative of whether sex is being exchanged for a fee.338 In all
three cities with condoms-as-evidence policies, the act that needs to be
proven to prosecute someone for prostitution is engaging in sex acts in
exchange for a fee.339 Condoms cannot prove that someone is exchanging
sex acts for a fee.340 They merely prove that someone is protecting
themselves from sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted pregnancy
while engaging in sex.341 Because police infringement on the right to
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

See Siegel, supra note 57, at 360.
See supra notes 256, 261–65 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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contraception is not narrowly tailored, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny
standard necessary for an infringement on a fundamental right to be deemed
constitutional.342
CONCLUSION
Sex workers throughout the United States use condoms to protect
themselves from sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted pregnancy.
Police officers confiscate these condoms for the purpose of using them as
evidence in the prosecution of prostitution. The Supreme Court has
recognized fundamental rights that states cannot infringe upon unless a law
or policy is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. The
right to access and use contraception is one of those fundamental rights.
Because the Supreme Court has identified a right for all individuals to be
free from state interference in their choice of whether to use contraceptive
devices, state actors confiscating condoms from suspected sex workers
infringes on that constitutionally protected privacy right. The government’s
lack of a compelling state interest in taking condoms, coupled with the
failure to narrowly tailor the policy so as to involve the least restrictive
infringement of the right, means that the conduct cannot survive strict
scrutiny. For this reason, New York City, Washington, D.C., and Los
Angeles are enforcing unconstitutional policies and must stop confiscating
condoms from suspected sex workers.

342. See supra Part I.A.4.

